

EXHIBIT 8

DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis Vaughn Index
Color of Change v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-08215 (S.D.N.Y.)

DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis Freedom of Information Act Request No. 2017-IALI-00002

Date: January 9, 2018

<i>A Doc. No.</i>	<i>Doc. Description</i>	<i>Bates Nos.</i>	<i>Status/Exemption</i>	<i>Justification/Description</i>	<i>Redaction Category</i>
1	Email Analysis Titled "RE: Dallas TPs for General Taylor (**UPDA TE**)"	000253 - 000255	Withheld in Part (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)	<p>The withheld information is finished intelligence analysis relating to July 7, 2016 shooting incident involving Dallas, TX police officers, contained in the body of an email, produced by DHS/I&A as a member of the Intelligence Community (IC). Information withheld under (b)(3) consists of, or relates to, intelligence sources and methods that are protected from unauthorized disclosure under 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(11) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i). The redacted information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(11) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) as disclosure of this document would reveal intelligence sources and methods utilized by I&A. Specifically, it would reveal (1) the underlying sources of information and intelligence that I&A relied upon to form its analytical assessments and draft this intelligence product; (2) I&A's assessment of these sources, including I&A's determination of which publicly available sources are reputable; (3) intelligence and law enforcement information internal to I&A's IC partners; (4) the analytical insights of I&A and the IC into domestic terrorist actors and events; (5) I&A and the IC's analytical insights into domestic extremist groups; (6) assessments of particular extremist events and their outcomes; and (7) vulnerabilities and limits in intelligence methods based upon the IC's collection methods, allocation of resources, and focus of assessments that could be exploited by terrorist groups.</p> <p>Information redacted under (b)(5) describes predecisional and deliberative internal discussions between DHS/I&A officials addressing drafting, negotiating, analytical, tradecraft, and writing issues in a draft product, as well as the draft product</p>	<p>Statutorily Exempted Information;</p> <p>Deliberative Process Privilege (Pre-Decisional);</p>

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			<p>itself. Releasing this information could chill candid discussions between officials within the Department.</p> <p>Information withheld under (b)(6) consists of contact and personnel name information for DHS/I&A. The contact information is redacted because release would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Release of such information does not shed light on how DHS/I&A performs its mission nor is there any public interest in the disclosure of such information.</p> <p>Information redacted under (b)(7)(C) describes and relates to a public person of interest in a law enforcement investigation who was interviewed and released. Releasing this information would be an unwarranted invasion of the subject's personal privacy as well as potentially harm law enforcement and national security investigations.</p> <p>The redacted information is also protected from release under exemption (b)(7)(E), as release of this information would reveal techniques, procedures, and guidelines for national security investigations and prosecutions and could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law. This includes information on (1) the indicators that an individual may be radicalizing to domestic extremism; (2) particular subjects of interest for domestic extremism; (3) the presence or non-presence of connections to international terrorism; (4) the process through which I&A and the IC assess sources, threats, radicalization, and indicators; and (5) procedures or guidelines for collaboration and coordination across the U.S. Government. Release of this information would enable domestic extremist actors to exploit the information in</p>	<p>Protected personal information;</p> <p>Law Enforcement Information; and</p> <p>Law Enforcement Information.</p>
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				order to avoid detection by I&A and the IC and interfere with I&A's intelligence collection, thereby endangering U.S. national security.	
2	Email Analysis Titled "RE: (U//LES) Race Paper for First Level Review"	000265	Withheld in Part (b)(5), (b)(6)	<p>Information redacted under (b)(5) describes predecisional and deliberative internal discussions between DHS/I&A officials addressing drafting, analytical, tradecraft, and writing issues in a draft product. Releasing this information could chill candid discussions between officials within the Department.</p> <p>Information withheld under (b)(6) consists of contact and personnel name information for DHS/I&A. The contact information is redacted because release would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Release of such information does not shed light on how DHS/I&A performs its mission nor is there any public interest in the disclosure of such information.</p>	<p>Deliberative Process Privilege (Pre-Decisional); and</p> <p>Protected Personal Information.</p>
3	Draft Intelligence Assessment Referred to in Emails as a Version of a "Race Paper"	<p>000508 – 000516 (draft one)</p> <p>000524 – 000532 (draft two)</p> <p>000533 – 000539 (draft three)</p>	Withheld in Full (b)(3), (b)(5)	<p>The withheld information is part of a finished intelligence product that was never finalized or disseminated outside of DHS/I&A. The document contains evaluated intelligence information produced by DHS/I&A as a member of the IC. Information withheld under (b)(3) consists of, or relates to, intelligence sources and methods that are protected from unauthorized disclosure under 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(11) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i). The redacted information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(11) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) as disclosure of this document would reveal intelligence sources and methods utilized by I&A. Specifically, it would reveal (1) the underlying sources of information and intelligence that I&A relied upon to form its analytical assessments and draft this intelligence product, including the identities of confidential sources of information; (2) I&A's assessment of these sources, including I&A's</p>	<p>Statutorily Exempted Information; and</p>

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		<p>000540 – 000548 (draft four)</p> <p>000549 – 000554 (draft five)</p> <p>000555 – 000565 (draft six)</p> <p>000566 – 000577 (draft seven)</p>		<p>determination of which publicly available sources are reputable; (3) the non-attributable methods by which I&A collected departmental and national intelligence for the Department and IC from publicly available sources; (4) I&A’s core analytical judgments regarding the scope, reach, and effectiveness of domestic terrorism threats; (5) I&A’s evaluation of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by domestic terrorist actors; (6) the subjects and targets of interest to I&A, the Department, and the intelligence community; (7) recommended mitigation strategies to counter domestic terrorism; (8) the confidence-level of I&A’s analytical assessments and methods of self and peer assessment of analytical intelligence products; and (9) vulnerabilities in intelligence methods based upon I&A and the IC’s collection methods, allocation of resources, and focus of assessments that could be exploited by terrorist actors.</p> <p>Information redacted under (b)(5) is predecisional and deliberative internal information shared between DHS/I&A officials addressing drafting, analytical, tradecraft, and writing issues in a draft intelligence product., to include in-line edits and comments, as well as incremental revisions that reflect the deliberative process. Releasing this information and exposing the process could chill candid discussions between officials within the Department and interfere with the development of intelligence analysis and policy. Release could also create public confusion by disclosing intelligence rationales and analysis that may were not ultimately adopted in a final product.</p>	<p>Deliberative Process Privilege (Pre- Decisional).</p>
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